PART I - JANUARY-JUNE
(Part II - see below)
SUMMARY STATEMENT
The first six months of this year, compared to the same period of last year, saw a number of significant changes: Total arrivals increased by 50%; Tunisian departures almost stopped; the number of migrants leaving from Libya practically doubled, and there was a 50% increase in arrivals from the 'East', amongst them a growing number of Egyptians and Syrians. There was also a shift in arrival destinations: For Malta the figures are down, for Southern Italy they are up. Lampedusa saw several 'waves' – the largest around the middle of June. The political scene changed, too. Malta, Italy and Tunisia have new governments, and in Libya the GNC president was replaced. Libyan transition remains fragile – and insecure – making the country a (risky) transit route for sub-Saharan Africans. To limit the flow, both national and international efforts are being undertaken. As usual, the European Union is concentrating on border surveillance and on strengthening its asylum policy.
ARRIVALS & DESTINATIONS
There were (by my count) 6'765 arrivals during the first half of 2013 compared to 4'073 during same period of 2012. Lampedusa saw 2'967 landings (vs. 849), Southern Italy 3'488 (vs. 2'252). Only Malta witnessed a decrease: 310 compared to 972. As usual, and as Graph 2 shows, most arrivals were during the second quarter. For Lampedusa and Southern Italy the inflow was extremely uneven. Lampedusa saw five major 'waves': a first one in late March, two in April and a fourth in the first part of May. There was then a six-week pause, followed by a fifth surge of nearly 900 migrants between 15 and 20 June. Meteorological conditions explain part of the pattern, but it seems that organized smuggling played a role as well.
DEPARTURE AREAS
Tunisian departures, as Graph 3 shows, almost stopped. It is possible that some sub-Saharan Africans (originally from Libya) left from Tunisia, but only 73 Tunisian nationals were counted. The number was 1'054 for the same period of last year, and 15'000 in 2011. The decrease contrasts with an increase in the two other areas of departure. The number of migrants leaving from Libya jumped from 1'693 last year to 4'359 this year. Most of them, as mentioned, are sub-Saharan Africans heading for Lampedusa and Malta. Arrivals from the 'East' are also up: from 1'335 last year to 2'333 this year. As usual, these migrants landed in Calabria and Apulia, although some made it to the Eastern coast of Sicily. Most are referred to as 'Asians' and include Afghans, Pakistanis and Iraqis, but there is also an increasing number of Syrians and Egyptians.
VICTIMS
Although arrivals are up by over 50%, the number of victims decreased. My count is 78 casualties during the first semester, compared to 108 for the same period of 2012. Of the 78 victims, 26 were found dead, and 52 are reported missing. There were four major accidents, two off the Libyan coast and two near Italy. The largest accident with 41 victims occurred on 19 March west of Tripoli (LH 19.3.); another accident with 20 victims occurred on 16 April near the coast of Apulia (ANSA 16.4.). Seven casualties were reported on 16 June off Lampedusa (ANSA 16.6.), and there were 5 more victims on 13 April, again west of Tripoli (LH 13.4.). Most of the casualties were sub-Sahara Africans starting from Libya. The route from Libya, as always, turns out to be the most hazardous. The 20 Apulia victims were 'Asians'; there were no reports of Tunisian victims.
SUCCESSFUL SAR OPERATIONS
Not all SAR operations are successful, but, as last year, the large majority are. All told, 34 operations were communicated, 4 during the first quarter, 30 during the second. Most of them were carried out by the Italian Guardia Costiera, a well-equipped force specialized in handling various types of maritime rescues. In many cases the force was assisted by the Guardia di Finanza and by ships of the Italian Navy. On four occasions commercial vessels were also involved (ANSA 10.4., Rep 22.4., Rep 15.6., ANSA 19.6.). Some Italian SAR operations were close to the Libyan coast. This is an indication that, if necessary, Italy operates far outside its own zone of responsibility.
SAR COOPERATION
SAR cooperation, too, seems to function in many instances. That is not self-evident given Malta's over-sized SAR Coordination area and the still unresolved issue of disembarkation. But, once again, there were no reports of Maltese-Italian disputes. On the contrary, there were several accounts of successful cooperation (ANSA 8.6., ANSA 11.5.) In one case Italian units also cooperated with the Tunisian Coast Guard (Rep 9.6.) and in another case with both Maltese and Libyan units (ANSA 11.5.).
'CANALE 13'
A multi-national SAR exercise called 'Canale 13' was conducted in June (AFM 19.6.). It was organized by North African and Southern European states participating in the '5+5 Dialogue' – Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania on the one hand, and Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta on the other. At the '5+5' summit in Malta on 6 October 2012 the participants decided to set up a Search and Rescue task force. 'Canale 13' seems to have resulted from that decision. No details about the nature of the exercise were communicated, and there is also no information about a possible repetition.
TUNISIA
Provisional Tunisian PM Hamadi Jebali resigned on 19 February. Ali Larayedh was appointed Prime Minister in early March (TAP 19.2., TAP 8.3.). On 15 June, the new Tunisian draft constitution was submitted after 18 months of deliberations (TAP 15.6.). Elections for a new parliament are expected to take place in the fall. The transition process is being accompanied by regular contacts with the European Union. In January, Herman van Rompuy visited Tunisia (TAP 16.1.), and in June PM Ali Larayedh met J.M. Barroso in Brussels (TAP 25.6.). The purpose of both meetings was to clarify the 'privileged partnership' signed on 19 November 2012. However, it is not clear what the agreement exactly stands for, especially with regard to maritime migration.
TUNISIAN SAR INFORMATION
Information about Tunisian SAR operations is rare. According to an unconfirmed NGO statement, 65 sub-Saharan Africans were rescued in March off Médenine on the way from Libya to Italy. Given its source, the account is anything but comprehensive (FFM 28.3.). To beef up Tunisian SAR capabilities Italy supplied the country with new patrol boats. In January, two off-shore patrol boats were delivered (FFM 12.1.), followed in April by two more boats and 60 land vehicles (TAP 24.4.). We do not know whether the hardware went to the Tunisian Navy or the National Guard. There is also no indication concerning the context of these Italian deliveries.
TUNISIAN DEPARTURE PREVENTIONS
Three reports deal with Tunisian departure preventions. A first official communication, in early January, referred to a case near Monastir, but no details were given (TAP 8.1.). A second account, coming from NGOs, mentioned 20 (possibly 22) migrants intercepted by the National Guard, again near Monastir (FFM 17.2.). A third (official) report referred to 26 nationals stopped by the Coast Guard off Kelibia (near Tunis) (TAP 17.4.). There was also an official news release referring to six Tunisians arrested for organized illegal migration (TAP 3.1.).
MISSING 'HARRAGAS'
The fate of missing 'harragas' continues to occupy families and NGOs. There is still no official statement about the joint Italian-Tunisian investigation started last year after the 6 September Lampedusa accident with 79 victims. The lack of news explains why the mothers of missing 'harragas' sent a video letter to the mayor of Lampedusa, Giusti Nicolini, demanding an investigation by the European Parliament (StM 2.7.). The request was accompanied by a list describing eight unresolved cases and was published by Storie migranti (StM 20.7.)
CONTESTED FIGURES
Figures about missing 'harragas' remain contested. At the end of March, the Fondation Tunisienne pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux (FTDES) issued a report dealing with the year 2012 (link). 350 Tunisians 'disappeared', so the conclusion, and 'several dozen' died, amounting to a total of around 400 casualties. My count is much lower: Of a total of 309 victims for the entire Central Mediterranean at most 100 are Tunisians, 79 of whom were those lost in the 7 September accident off Lampedusa. FTDES figures for 2011 are also much higher; the NGO mentions 1'000 Tunisian victims; my count is 350. Lower figures are also used in the video message sent by the mothers of missing 'harragas' to Lampedusa Mayor Giusi Nicolini. They mention that between 250 and 400 families were affected in two years.
LIBYA
Libya is also in a state of political transition, but the situation is more fluid and fragile than in Tunisia. Cabinet members come and go, among them the ministers of defense, the interior and foreign affairs. Mohammed el-Megarif, GNC chairman and provisional president, left office in June in response to a decree ('Isolation Law') prohibiting high-ranking Gaddafi officials to be politically active (LH 28.5.). Violent unrest is endemic and assassinations are common. The government lacks control over many areas, including land and maritime borders. Small wonder that Libya is a transit route for sub-Saharan Africans and that organized migrant smuggling cannot be stopped. Reports about SAR incidents are still scarce, but some do find their way into the local press (LH 19.4., LH 13.4., LH 14.5.).
LIBYAN SECURITY
Libyan insecurity creates uneasiness and is the subject of diplomatic discussions. Early in the year, Libyan PM el-Megarif met his counterparts from Algeria and Tunisia in Ghadames (Libya) to deal with border security (TA 11.1.). El-Megarif also went to Rome, and as part of the visit, the defense ministers of Libya and Italy conferred (ANSAmed 10.1.). In February, the Libyan and Maltese Foreign Ministers met in Tripoli ahead of a special Paris Summit on Libyan security (LH 10.2.). And the new Maltese PM, Joseph Muscat, visited Tripoli twice, also to discuss security (LH 29.4., MT 23.6.).
'FRENCH CONNECTION'
The French, given their involvement in Mali, seem to take a particular interest in Libyan security. It was the French government that organized a Libyan security conference in Paris attended by eleven nations, including a number of IOs (LH 12.2.). No specifics were published, but it was apparent that, among other things, France was ready to beef up the Libyan Coast Guard. Thirty patrol boats were delivered in May, with 25 South Korean vessels to follow (LH 20.5.). An additional French boat arrived in June (LH 23.6.). Also in June there was a Libyan-French naval exercise (LH 27.6.), and, as mentioned, France and Libya were both involved in 'Canale 13'. It was also in the French (and Italian) interest, one would assume, to put Libya on the G8 Agenda (LH 18.6.), to invite PM Zeidan to NATO headquarters (PTV 27.5.) and to persuade Libya to seek OSCE membership (LH 29.6.).
ITALY & LAMPEDUSA
In April, Enrico Letta followed Mario Monti as Italian prime minister. Anna Maria Cancellieri left the Interior Ministry and is now in charge of Justice. The impact of these changes on the situation at Lampedusa continued to be positive. There is no repetition of the deplorable situation 'produced' by the Berlusconi government in 2011. There is also a new minister for integration, Cecile Kyenge, an immigrant from Congo (Zaire). She visited Lampedusa after the massive June influx and, together with Mayor Giusi Nicolini, managed to introduce some changes (ANSA 25.6.). The reception center is now more regularly cleared by transferring migrants by ferry (or by air). However, it remains uncertain whether 'collective returns' are still taking place – not of East Africans likely to obtain asylum but, as the UNHCR fears, with respect to Egyptians (HCR 30.4.).
MALTA
Malta has a new government, too. The Socialist Party won the March elections and replaced the Nationalists who, with a minor interruption, had ruled for 26 years (ToM 13.3.). With regard to migration the new prime minister, Joseph Muscat, is pursuing a more aggressive line. He complains about EU inaction and mentions 'push-back' as an alternative (MT 26.6., ToM 23.5.). The unresolved issues, we know, are disembarkation and relocation. On these points Malta expects more EU solidarity. The demand is not unreasonable. Over 90% of the arriving migrants obtain refugee or humanitarian status, by far the highest rate in the EU, as EUROSTAT and EASO figures show (ToM 18.6., Eurostat, EASO). The reason, of course, is that most arrivals are from East Africa. It is true that the two relocation programs, EUREMA and USRAP, continue to function (ToM 17.1., ToM 2.4.) and that there are also voluntary returns (MT 25.6.). But in Maltese eyes that is not enough.
EU & ASYLUM
The EU, once more, is concentrating on asylum policy and border surveillance. In both areas Parliament now has the last say. The tripartite process is slow, but the quality of regulations and directives tends to improve. Efforts to strengthen the Common European Asylum System are a case in point. On 11 and 12 June the EUPL approved of changes affecting the Reception Conditions Directive, the Asylum Procedures Directive and the Dublin Regulation (EUCL 7.6.). The goal is to harmonize standards and to improve migrant protection and administrative efficiency. On 17 June the EU Commission published its 4th Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum. Besides giving a useful overview it mentions some of the issues that remain to be solved (EUCOM 17.6.). That includes intra-EU relocation and, tied to it, the thorny matter of debarkation.
EU & BORDER SURVEILLANCE
In April, the Commission submitted a proposal to the Council and to Parliament summarizing the various aspects of border surveillance and proposing improved FRONTEX rules for the conduct of Joint Operations at sea (EUCOM 12.4.). The emphasis, inspired by the ECtHR ruling on Hirsi v. Italy, is on strengthening the basic rights of migrants. There is no mention of the disembarkation problem, however. Parliament debated the Commission proposal twice (BE 16.5., HRW 6.6.); a final decision is expected in September. Council and Parliament are also in the process of amending EUROSUR guidelines. The aim is to improve national cooperation in border surveillance, including the continued development of 'smart borders'. No details have been published as yet. A provisional agreement between the two bodies has been reached (EUPL 30.5., EUCL 14.6.). Here, too, a decision is expected in the fall. In January, and as part of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, the Foreign Affairs Council created a (civilian) Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to be operative in Libya (EUCL 31.1.).
MIGRANT SMUGGLING
Migrant smuggling takes different forms. The relatively isolated arrivals from the 'East' suggest the existence of individual 'entrepreneurs'. The massive 'waves' of sub-Saharan Africans during short periods of time indicate more organized forms of 'facilitation'. As usual, there are numerous Italian reports about smuggler arrests (Rep 15.1., CdM 8.5., ANSA 2.6.) and about juridical prosecutions (ANSA 14.2., Rep 4.3.). Similar news emanates from Malta. In March three Mali nationals were convicted of organizing a failed escape of 25 migrants to Italy in 2010 (ToM 13.3.). In addition, a Maltese national faced trial for organizing a fatal voyage in 2006 (MT 25.6.). Migrant smuggling to Italy is a Maltese reality, and one wonders why not more cases are detected and prosecuted.
PHOTOS AND VIDEOS
There is a growing availability of photos and videos about SAR operations. The main source is La Repubblica (Rep 17.6., Rep 19.6.), but the Maltese media, too, are beginning to make use of visual information (MT 29.3.). The importance of such material must not be underestimated. Films and pictures show how difficult it can be to rescue migrants in distress at sea. Coast Guard crews often try to prevent the worst – panics, stampedes and the capsizing of entire boats. Images can also help in the search for missing 'harragas', as a list of eight unresolved cases published by Storie migranti demonstrates (StM 20.7.). Some pictures allow family members to trace the routes taken by missing sons. The eight stories also show that the use (by migrants) of mobile and satellite phones can facilitate tracing.
DATA QUALITY
As usual, the most reliable information stems from the Maltese government. Official figures indicate that 310 migrants arrived during the first semester; my count is exactly the same (MT 24.6. UNHCR headquarters report 600 Malta arrivals, which is wrong and confirms a tendency in some organizations to publish figures that are inflated (HCR 5.7.).
The accuracy of figures about Italian arrivals can also vary, but some numbers are amazingly close. FRONTEX, covering the 'main' Central Mediterranean route (excluding Calabria and Apulia) reports 1'124 arrivals for the first quarter of this year (FRAN Q1 2013). My count is 1'126! Other accounts are further apart. For the first six months of 2013 the Italian Interior Ministry speaks of 7'913 arrivals (ANSA 29.6.). UNHCR mentions 7'800 (HCR 5.7.), and boat4people reports 7'200 (b4p 24.6.). My count is a mere 6'455! It is possible, of course, that the media on which I rely do not report all landings, but can they miss 1'500, most of which must have occurred during the second quarter?
PART II - JULY-DECEMBER
SUMMARY STATEMENT
There were, by my count, 38'000 arrivals in 2013, roughly three times more than in 2012 (Arrivals 2013). But there were fewer than in 2011, when 47'000 migrants crossed the Central Mediterranean. Until the end of September, it looked as if the number of victims might be limited, but two massive accidents on 3 and 11 October brought the overall total to 766. The EU Commission reacted by creating a 'Task Force Mediterranean' mandated to submit a report by the end of the year. The paper contains 38 recommendations, none of which are really new. Libya and Tunisia are still in political transition―but with an important difference. In Tunisia governmental institutions are functioning; in Libya they are not. Which explains why Libya is still a major transit country for East Africans and, increasingly, for Syrians. The main arrival destinations, as usual, are Sicily and Lampedusa, but also Calabria, Apulia and Malta.
ARRIVALS & DESTINATIONS
As Graphs 1 and 2 indicate, the arrival pattern was highly uneven. Of the 38'000 migrants only 6'765 reached our shores during the first half of the year; during the second six months the number jumped to 31'228! The 3rd quarter was the busiest, with 19'594 arrivals, followed by the 4th quarter with 11'634. Given the usual autumn storms, hardly anyone arrived from 10 to 30 November. Graph 2 also shows the impact on destinations. Most landings, for the entire year, were in Southern Italy (23'094), more precisely in Sicily, Calabria and Apulia. Lampedusa saw 12'906 arrivals, Malta 1993. Roughly the same pattern prevailed during the 3rd and 4th quarters.
DEPARTURE AREAS
Looking at the entire year, 28'334 migrants arrived from Libya, 9'307 from the 'East' and 352 from Tunisia (Arrivals & Departure Areas). An identical pattern prevailed during each of the four quarters, as Graph 3 indicates. The Tunisian figure is extremely low, down from 1'895 in 2012. It is a clear sign that migrants are finding it difficult to depart from Tunisia. Even Tunisian 'harragas' may choose to depart from Libya rather than from their own country. In fact, with its 28'334 departures in 2013, Libya has become a highly attractive transit country. In 2012 the number was 6'400. The largest groups are now Syrians, followed by East Africans from Eritrea and Somalia. In its November report for Libya the UNHCR mentions 16'000 registered Syrians, compared with 3'300 Eritreans and 1'900 Somalis (Fact-sheet UNHCR Libya November 2013).
Departures from the 'East' are up as well, jumping from 2'333 in 2012 to 9'307. And, as is to be expected, the difference of 7'000 migrants is in large part due to Syrian nationals. They tend to land in Calabria and Apulia, although as mentioned above, many depart from Libya and arrive in Sicily. As usual, 'Eastern' arrivals also include Afghans, Pakistanis, Iraqis and some Egyptians.
VICTIMS
Up to the end of September, there were 141 victims (dead and missing). This figure was modest, given the high number of arrivals. One of the reasons was improvement in the interplay of coordination, rescue and disembarkation. In other words, SAR disputes between Italy and Malta were largely avoided. It also helped that more merchant ships helped than in previous years. There were four such rescues during a single week in August involving a total of 670 migrants (ANSA 4.8., ANSA 5.8., BS 6.8., ANSA 8.8.). Unfortunately, the positive picture changed during the first ten days of October, when in two tragic accidents at least 600 migrants died. The annual total jumped to 766, double the number reported in 2012 (309 victims). The two accidents shared certain similarities: The boats departed from Libya, headed for Lampedusa and were completely overloaded. But there were major differences (photos Rep).
TWO ACCIDENTS
The first accident occurred on 3 October 2013 just one NM off Lampedusa. Because of engine failure, the migrants lit a blanket soaked with gasoline in an attempt to signal their location. But the fire spread, people rushed to one side – and the boat capsized (Rep 3.10., BBC 4.10., BBC 5.10.). It all happened very quickly. There was no time to organize an effective SAR operation (MaS 4.10.). A total of 155 Eritreans could be rescued, largely by informal means; 366 drowned in sight of the shore.
The second accident happened on 10 October, but its causes are not as clear. Two boats sent out distress signals from a location 60 NM south of Lampedusa. Some survivors alleged that the boats had been fired upon by 'the Libyans' and began to take on water. Although 120 NM away from Malta, the migrants were within the Maltese coordination zone. An AFM airplane spotted the vessels, and the Maritime Squadron rescued 147; Italy managed to save 56 (BBC 11.10.). Around 250 were reported missing. According to press accounts, the problem was coordination. Some journalists blamed Italy (MT 1.12.), others found fault with the Maltese (MInd 16.12., MT 18.12.). No final judgment is possible – so far.
'MARE NOSTRUM'
The two accidents made headlines, and the Italian government reacted quickly – and effectively (BBC 14.10.). Within days Italy initiated an operation called 'Mare Nostrum' (photos). The Italian navy, with ships and helicopters, was ordered to patrol the waters between Libya and Italy (ANSA 18.10., AF 19.10.). The Guardia Costiera and the Guardia di Finanza, usually the main actors, assumed a subsidiary role. By the end of the year, the operation was still going on, and it has so far proved to be extremely effective. Although most rescues are closer to Lampedusa than to Sicily, disembarkations are usually in Sicilian harbors, at Pozzallo, Siracusa, Augusta and Catania.
'TASK FORCE MEDITERRANEAN'
The European Union reacted as well. Commissioner Malmström was 'deeply saddened' and promised action (EUCOM 3.10.). At a meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA Council) Malmström demanded that FRONTEX play a larger role (EUCOM 8.10.). In addition, and to suggest improvements, European Commission President Barroso announced the formation of a 'Task Force Mediterranean' (EUCOM 25.10.). The result was a paper containing 38 different suggestions submitted at the JHA Council meeting of early December (EUCOM 4.12., MT 4.12.). It was a summary of what the EU was already doing; the tenor was 'more of the same'. At the December EU Summit the issue was also discussed but, as the final document shows, in a rather cursory fashion (EUCL 20.12.). The only concrete and effective innovation, as it turned out, was of a national character: Italy's 'Mare Nostrum'.
EUROSUR & FRONTEX OPERATING RULES
The purpose of EUROSUR is to coordinate national efforts in border surveillance by creating an EU-wide data network. The regulations governing the scheme were approved in October, first by the EU Parliament (EUPL 10.10.) and then by the Council (EUCJHA 22.10.). EUROSUR became operative in early December (EUCOM 29.11.).
Redefining the FRONTEX rules guiding the conduct of Joint Operations at sea was another project. After the European Court of Justice rejected a first proposal in 2012, the Commission submitted a second proposal in April 2013 to both Council and Parliament (EUCOM 12.4.). The emphasis, inspired by the Hirsi vs. Italy ruling of 2012, was on strengthening the basic rights of migrants. Parliament debated the proposal in May and June (HRW 6.6.) but there was no final decision. In October, six EU Mediterranean countries (Spain, France, Italy, Malta, Greece and Cyprus) rejected the proposal. One of the reasons was that the disembarkation issue remained unsolved. The 'host country' rule continues to prevail (ANSAmed 15.10., MaS 16.10.).
'SEAHORSE MEDITERRANEO'
In September, the EU Commission organized a meeting in Madrid to discuss a maritime control program called 'Seahorse Mediterraneo' (ANSAmed 19.9., LH 22.9.). The project is seen as an extension of 'SEAHORSE Atlantico', an effort to manage migration on the EU's Atlantic borders and in operation since 2010. The arrangement includes Spain and Portugal on the EU side and countries ranging from Morocco to Guinea-Bissau on the African side. 'SEAHORSE Atlantico' combines maritime patrols with a system of high-tech border surveillance and proves to be effective (Guardia Civil). The Commission's idea is to set up a similar network in the Mediterranean. States from both sides are meant to participate, amongst them Italy and Malta, Libya and Tunisia. The scheme is tied to EUROSUR and to EU Mobility Partnerships (EUCL 25.11.).
PUSH-BACK
Push-backs, as practiced by Berlusconi and Gaddafi, were declared illegal in 2012. It was therefore surprising to hear newly elected Maltese PM Muscat announce in early July that push-backs might be resumed – if necessary (MT 5.7.). It is true that Malta has the highest per-capita rate of asylum seekers in the EU, but given the ECtHR ruling, push-backs are no longer an acceptable method to reduce arrivals. The Court and Commissioner Malmström objected within days (MT 9.7., MT 9.7.). President van Rompuy travelled to Malta (MT 11.7.), and to top it off, an impressive number of Maltese experts joined the critics (ToM 12.7.). After that, PM Muscat no longer mentioned push-backs as a possibility; he spoke instead of the need for greater EU burden-sharing.
Although Italy discontinued maritime push-backs two years ago, there are regular reports of aerial push-backs of Egyptians. NGOs tell us that 19 Egyptians were flown back within two days of their arrival in August (SM 21.8., telib 2.9.) and that another 10 Egyptians were repatriated within two days in September (SM 11.9.). In November, the UNHCR complained about similar practices (UNHCR 12.11.), and a few days later the EU Ombudsman asked Italy to conduct an investigation. Critics also wonder whether the Italian-Libyan coast guard cooperation agreement, signed in October, makes any mention of push-back practices (CdM 8.10.). FRONTEX has been accused at times of participating in Italian push-back operations. The new rules governing Return Operations, published in December, are meant to prevent such tactics (FRONTEX 9.12.).
DATA QUALITY
The gap existing between the numbers released by the Italian Ministry of the Interior (the 'Viminale') and those underlying this website is narrowing. According to the Ministry, 42'925 migrants arrived 'on all coasts' during 2013. If the 1'842 Adriatic arrivals are deducted, the total for the Central Mediterranean is 41'083 (Pan 3.1.14.). My figure is 36'000 – or 14% lower. The discrepancy is relatively modest, given the different types of sources used. The numbers for Libyan departures are closer yet, although in this case my figure is somewhat higher. The Ministry mentions 27'314 migrants; my count is 28'334. The Ministry's nationality figures confirm that with 11'300 departures the Syrians are now the largest single group leaving from Libya, followed by 9'834 Eritreans and 3'263 Somalis (Pan 3.1.14.). Also, in early September Interior Minister Alfano indicated that up to then 6'920 migrants had landed in Sicily. My count is around 6'200. Again, the difference is minor (Rep 6.9.).
FRONTEX figures, as usual, are not as close. For the 1st quarter of 2013, the FRAN Q2 Report mentions 1'626 Central Mediterranean arrivals (including Calabria and Apulia); my count is 1'325. For the 2nd quarter the figure is 6'599; mine is 5'028. The differences range from 20% to almost 30% (FRAN Q2). The figures on victims published by Fortress Europe used to be reliable and close to mine. Unfortunately, that is not the case for 2013. For some reason, the list is highly incomplete. It fails to mention 16 incidents, some of which are sizeable. Small wonder that the total number of victims for the Central Mediterranean is a mere 574 (Fortress Europe), whereas my (conservative) count is 766. Finally, and most interestingly, there are an increasing number of SAR reports from Tunisia and Libya. From 1 July to 10 October there were ten reports from Tunisia, and from 9 July to 17 December there were eight reports from Libya.