SUMMARY 

In the past, the majority of boatpeople reaching Europe crossed the Central Mediterranean. Not so in 2015. Most of them now came via the Aegean Sea, then took the Balkan route and headed north. Around one million arrived in Germany. The political reactions were anything but coherent or effective. Angela Merkel practiced something like an Open Door policy and called repeatedly for a united European response. But given the dominance of narrow national considerations, solidarity was lacking. The existence of the Schengen Area was at risk. Although not a Schengen member, the British did not help things either. Their demand for fundamental EU changes placed an additional burden on the Brussels agenda. 

The many pending issues were discussed at several EU summits, and the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA) met a dozen times, as usual. The main focus was on strengthening the external Schengen borders and on relocation. So far the results have been meager. In Greece and Italy the installation of reception centers (called hotspots) has begun, but relocation stagnates. Given the massive increase in arrivals, it is no surprise that the total number of victims has gone up as well, as the table below indicates. 

 

	Arrivals (UNHCR)		Victims (IOM)
	2015	2014	2015	2014
Central Med	153’600	170’100	2’892	2’800 approx.
Aegean	856’723	41’038	805	200 approx.
Subtotal	1’010’323	211’138	3’697	3’000 approx.
Total Med	1’014’836	216’054	3’771	3’279

  

DIFFERENT SEAS

From a geographical point of view the two maritime routes are very different. The journey across the Central Mediterranean is long and dangerous. In the Eastern Mediterranean, in contrast, numerous Greek islands are within sight of Turkey. The way across the Aegean is often short and much less hazardous. Arrival patterns and rescue operations show the difference. In the Central Mediterranean, given the calm summer months, most arrivals are from May to July, when large Triton vessels are ready to take the migrants to the major ports of Southern Italy. Not so in the Aegean. Here small boats land by the thousands and without any coordination on the beaches of at least seven different islands. Rescues do take place but not with the help of an operation comparable to Triton.   

The difference also shows in the number of victims. In the Central Mediterranean, with four to five times fewer arrivals, the total number of victims is four times higher – a clear indication that the journey from Libya to Italy is much more dangerous. The national origin of migrants is different, too. It is mostly sub-Saharan Africans that arrive in Italy, whereas in Greece the majority are Syrians, Iraqis, and Afghans. Migrant smuggling, too, takes place under different circumstances. In Libya, a failing state, there is no central authority to control smugglers. But Turkey is a functioning state. It was possible, therefore, for the EU to approach the Erdogan government in December and to negotiate arrangements that, should they work, might eliminate some of the worst aspects of migrant smuggling. 

     

DIFFERENT ACCIDENTS 

The nature of accidents also varies. Given the use of relatively large but overloaded vessels in the Central Mediterranean, accidents are often massive in scale. The situation is aggravated by the fact that smugglers rarely equip boatpeople with life vests and that as a rule, sub-Saharan Africans are unable to swim. In the Aegean, where the use of small rubber dinghies dominates, the number of accidents is relatively high. However, the number of victims per accident is comparatively low. It also helps that life jackets are common. It is hardly a surprise, therefore, that in 2015 the Central Mediterranean, once again, saw several large accidents. There were eight calamities with around 50 dead each. Five accidents, however, were truly massive with 200 victims and more. One occurred on February 9, two on April 13 and 19, and two more on August 5 and 28. The accident of April 19 was the biggest, with 800 dead. 

 

EU NAVAL OPERATIONS 

Frontex started Operation Triton (link) last November with a mandate that was restrictive. In February of this year the mission’s definition was widened, but the assets involved were still modest. That changed after the big April accident. From then on, large ships from up to eight different nations were present. There was also one from Ireland, not a Schengen state, and another from Iceland, a non-EU state. The effect was felt immediately. The involvement of commercial vessels decreased sharply, and there were no major accidents until August. Frontex also strengthened Operation Poseidon (link) in the Aegean. For a long time the mission was a mere sideshow, but in December Brussels announced an upgrading. In 2016 Poseidon will be involved both on land and at sea. The EU also launched an operation aimed at combatting migrant smuggling along the Libyan coast. Originally known as Eunavfor Med (link) it was later renamed and is now called Sophia (link). Given the operation's para-military nature, next to nothing is known about its activities. 

 

PRIVATE SAR EFFORTS 

Private rescue efforts also became more prominent. An Italian-Maltese operation by the name of Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) started last year. With a ship named Phoenix the organization concentrated on the Central Mediterranean. Once again several missions were carried out; the first ended on May 26, followed by a second one later on. Although no regular information is provided about individual rescues, we do know that in a number of instances MOAS cooperated with the Guardia Costiera and with Triton ships. In August of this year MOAS celebrated the first anniversary of its existence. On December 23 it was announced that a second MOAS vessel would soon be operative in the Aegean. 

In April MOAS teamed up with Médécins sans Frontières (MsF), and a month later, on May 9, MsF started its own SAR mission with a ship called the Bourbon Argos. As we learn from the press, MOAS and MsF cooperated regularly. There were at least three joint operations, two in May and one in August. Based on figures published in January 2016, MsF rescued a total of 20’129 persons.

A third private rescue venture, called Sea-Watch (link), is of German origin with a home base in the harbor of Hamburg. Unlike MOAS and MsF, the group runs a website with regular updates about its activities. Actual operations began in June out of Lampedusa with a ship carrying the organization's name. In the months that followed around 2’000 migrants were rescued in seven different missions. In October it was announced that the Sea-Watch would also operate in the Aegean. As of November 14, the ship was active off the island of Lesbos. 

 

SCHENGEN AT RISK 

As mentioned above, the political reaction was anything but coherent and, except for Operation Triton, not very effective either. As a consequence, the existence of the Schengen Area was at risk. The model’s basic idea is that national border controls can be eliminated, once common external border controls are in place. The arrangement functions at airports, but especially this year, it has failed at green and blue borders. There were over a million irregular entries – without proper registration. To compensate national controls were reintroduced. In other words, a second filter became necessary because the first filter did not work. To prevent a Schengen collapse the EU, as mentioned, aimed primarily at strengthening its external borders. Even European citizens will in the future be controlled more thoroughly. The need became manifest after the Paris terrorist attack of November 13. Some jihadists, carrying French passports, left and entered the Schengen Area too easily. 

 

EU COMMISSION 

The Commission launched a number of initiatives. A first step was the publication on April 20 of a Ten Point Action Plan on Migration (link).The plan is a brief enumeration of possible measures, ranging from financial considerations to proper registration and more effective return operations. The list is amazingly comprehensive, given the fact that the massive increase in arrivals had not yet begun. The list was followed, on May 13, by a more detailed plan, a European Agenda on Migration (link), that distinguishes between short and longer term actions. Since then, the Commission has made it a habit to regularly publish agenda updates entitled “State of Play: Measures to Address the Refugee Crisis.” Some of the updates are detailed. The November 4^th issue, for instance, contains country-by-country data on financial pledges, relocation quotas, hotspot installations, and migrant returns. 

 

NEW BORDER REGIME 

Hotspots, as the Commission sees them, serve a number of functions. Their main purpose is proper registration. Only after registration can asylum applications, return operations, or relocation flights be handled properly. More than a dozen of these centers are to be installed, six in Southern Italy and another five or six in Greece. The first were set up on two islands, at Lampedusa and Lesbos. By next spring, when arrivals are expected to increase again, the remaining hotspots should be operative as well. Some migrants are not pleased. There are reports that at Lampedusa Eritreans continue to resist registration. As they did in the past, they want to circumvent the EU’s Dublin Regulation (country of entry criterion) and move north to destinations of their choice. 

On December 15, the Commission announced additional plans to strengthen the new border regime. Frontex, so the proposal, must become an effective EU Border and Coast Guard Agency (link). The institution should possess supranational powers to be used in emergency situations. The concept was submitted at the EU summit of December 17. It met with general approval, but a final decision was postponed. It is fair to assume that in the coming year Frontex will still be limited to coordinating national efforts and that secondary filters will continue to be necessary. Germany reintroduced emergency controls on September 13. Counties including Hungary, Slovenia, or Austria did the same.    

 

RELOCATION QUOTAS 

The Dublin first country rule puts a heavy burden on peripheral states like Italy and Greece. Relocation is meant to provide relief, to distribute persons with a fair chance of obtaining asylum more evenly among Schengen states. In June the Commission proposed the relocation of 40’000 refugees based on national quotas. At the JHA Council meeting of June 26 the idea was accepted but only as a voluntary measure. In September the Commission suggested relocation quotas for another 120’000 persons. Although the proposal passed as a mandatory measure, there was stiff resistance on the part of some Eastern European countries. 

Actual relocations had a slow start. On October 9 a small group was flown from Italy to Sweden, followed on October 15 by a larger contingent to a number of different countries. On November 3, 30 refugees were airlifted from Greece to Luxemburg. Few other relocations seem to have taken place. Much more is needed, of course. Angela Merkel has repeatedly urged other EU members to show more solidarity. The contrary happened. On October 2, Slovakia, supported by Hungary, appealed to the European Court of Justice, challenging the legitimacy of the mandatory quota decision.  

  

SCHENGEN NEIGHBORHOOD 

The EU also became active outside the Schengen Area. The Balkans had priority because Macedonia and Serbia in particular were overrun by enormous numbers of migrants. Hungary’s construction of a fence aggravated the situation further. On October 25, the EU arranged a Western Balkans Route Leaders' Meeting. The result was a 17-Point Program that, among other things, aimed at improved coordination and the elimination of inhumane situations along the way. One of the consequences is that the border between Greece and Macedonia now functions as an informal filter. It is open for Syrians, Iraqis, and Afghans but closed for all other nationalities. 

Turkey was approached as well. On November 29, an agreement was signed that, at its core, contained a control-for-cash arrangement. The Erdogan government promised to tighten border controls (or combat migrant smuggling) in return for EU funds to improve health services and education for the two million refugees living inside Turkey. Since the problem’s real cause is the conflict in Syria, the EU also began to participate in efforts to find a political solution. It was present at the Vienna meeting of October 30 and in December took an active part in the deliberations of the UN Security Council. 

African states were also approached, because, for years already thousands of sub-Saharan migrants have crossed the Central Mediterranean. On November 11 and 12, the EU organized a summit of African and European states in Malta. Since underdevelopment is one of the causes driving migration, the summit decided, among other things, on the creation of an EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. Its main purpose is to offer young people opportunities for personal development and professional training. 

  

LIBYA AND UNSMIL 

Libya has been in turmoil since 2011. Numerous militias operate in different parts of the country, and two separate entities claim to represent legitimate authority. The political group that controls much of Eastern Libya has its seat in Tobruk. It emerged from national elections and enjoys international recognition. When it was outvoted in the General National Congress (GNC), it moved east and set up its own legislature, the House of Representatives (HoR). The other political grouping dominates in the West, controls the GNC, and has its seat in Tripoli. It is in this part of Libya that migrant smugglers operate and from where most boatpeople depart.   

The UN wants the two groups to form a common government. Until early November, the head of the effort, known as UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), was Bernardino Leon, a Spanish diplomat. Leon managed to organize several meetings in Geneva and Skhirat (Morocco) attended by both sides. On October 9 he presented plans for a government of national unity. The project was opposed, however, mainly by the Tobruk legislature. Leon quit on November 4. His successor, German diplomat Martin Kobler, was at first more successful. At a meeting in Tunis he got the two parties to agree to the formation of a Government of National Accord (GNA) and the naming of a provisional Prime Minister. But, once again, an influential HoR faction was opposed. 

 

DATA ON ARRIVALS & VICTIMS 

The most reliable figures on blue-border migration come from two international organizations, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Both collect arrival data for Italy and Greece, and the totals are amazingly close. Whereas the UNHCR concentrates mainly on arrivals, the IOM, as part of its Missing Migrants Project (begun in 2014) also publishes figures on fatalities in both the Central Mediterranean and the Aegean. As of this year, the data of both organizations appear on Internet platforms. The UNHCR provides monthly arrival figures accompanied by information on places of arrival, the national origin and demographic composition of migrants. Arrival figures are also published by Frontex, although with some delay. Quarterly data appear in the agency's FRAN Quarterly Reports, annual totals in its Annual Risk Analysis. The numbers for all of 2015 have not been published as yet. But, as the figures of previous years indicate, Frontex data do not deviate much from those of the two other organizations. EASO also publishes quarterly and annual reports but, as is to be expected, the agency concentrates on asylum applications.   

Frontex Arrival Figures (Annual Risk Analysis) 

	2011	2012	2013	2014
Central Med	64’261	15’151	45’298	170’664
Eastern Med	1’467	4’370	11’831	44’057

Fatality figures must be viewed with caution. As an example, for the Aegean the IOM mentions 805 victims, the UNHCR a mere 395. The difference seems puzzling but can be explained. IOM data cover the entire Aegean, whereas the UNHCR data stem from the Greek coast guard and are limited to Greek territorial waters. In other words, the two counts rest on different definitions of ‘Aegean.’ The definition of ‘Mediterranean’ can also vary. At times that term covers the entire sea from Gibraltar to Suez; at other times, it is limited to the main migration routes, the Central Mediterranean and the Aegean. Furthermore, figures about victims are often difficult to determine because they include both missing and dead. The numbers for deaths are relatively certain, but the numbers for missing can be quite imprecise. What heightens uncertainty is that most large accidents happened along the Libyan coast and in the absence of Triton ships.

For more than 20 years Mediterranean fatality figures have been collected and published by Gabriele Del Grande (link). Before IOM data were available, Del Grande’s numbers were cited by many organizations and media. That has now changed. At present WatchTheMed (link) is the most ambitious but also highly selective platform on accidents and victims. Its main purpose is to be useful in actual SAR operations, to function, as the authors say, as a “participatory mapping platform” capable of providing instant information about “ongoing situations of distress.” But, because concentrating on onging events, the effort is anything but complete. For the Central Mediterranean only two fatal accidents are listed for all of 2015. The tragedy of 19 April with 800 missing is not mentioned, and the same is true for other big accidents. My webpage lists 45 events, large and small, accompanied by fatalities.   

A website called The Migrants Files (link) represents another effort to deal with accidents and victims. It was started in August 2013 by journalists working for major European newspapers. Their aim is to “accurately calculate and report the deaths of emigrants”. The people operating the project do indeed take an interest in the fate of migrants, but there is no systematic effort to list accidents and to count victims. The list published in 2014, for example, mentions only 27 Central Mediterranean accidents with a total of 1’281 victims. That reflects about half the reality.