PART I - JANUARY-JUNE

(Part II - see below)

CHANGING DYNAMICS

During the first six months of 2011 about 35'000 migrants crossed the Central Mediterranean. This year the number is in the vicinity of 4'000 – or nine times less. It is an indication that the 2012 dynamics are different. There are fewer crossings, and patterns of arrival and of departure have changed. The number of accidents and victims has also diminished, and SAR and debarkation disputes are less frequent. The diplomatic and political fronts, too, are in motion. Unilateral, bilateral and multilateral efforts have been undertaken to find solutions for the more pressing problems. Some point in the right direction but many are incomplete, remain controversial or suffer from a lack of transparency. This is particularly true of agreements (or 'migration partnerships') tied to repatriation. Although the overall 'blue border' situation is less dramatic, much remains imperfect and has to be improved.

SHIFT IN ARRIVAL PATTERNS

Only 849 migrants have so far landed in Lampedusa, down from 32'000 a year ago. Southern Italy registered 2'252 arrivals (vs. 4'123 in 2011), Malta 972 (vs. 1'526). The numbers also show a shift in destinations. The main reason, of course, is that Lampedusa remains an 'unsafe port'. The diversion effect is obvious: In relative terms more boats are now headed for Malta, Sicily and Calabria. There is no clear indication whether or when Lampedusa will again become a 'safe port' to land. In Malta that creates a certain unease. In one week (from 27 May to 2 June) the island saw the arrival of 453 sub-Saharan Africans. The rush unleashed talk of a 'dramatic summer'. However, and as the government cautioned, such fears might prove unfounded (ToM 13.6.).

CHANGE IN DEPARTURE PATTERNS

In the first six months of the previous year 15'000 migrants departed from Tunisia, 20'000 from Libya. That pattern, too, has changed. Since January of this year only 1'045 migrants have arrived from Tunisia. The reasons, it seems, are mainly political: With the end of turmoil and the functioning of the transitional government emigration has become less attractive and organized migrant smuggling more difficult. Libya is now the main country of embarkation with around 1700 departures. More precisely put, Libya continues to be a transit country for sub-Sahara migrants, mainly from East Africa (FRAN Q1 2012). And, because Libyan politics are less settled, migrant smuggling continues to be a lucrative business, as interviews conducted in Malta indicate. Finally, there is an absolute increase in landings from other locations. In 2011, only 483 'Asians' arrived during the first six months, mostly from Greece and Turkey. That number has now jumped to 1335. As is to be expected, some refugees arrive from Syria, but there are also more Egyptians. Since April about 350 have landed, most of them in Southern Italy.

FEWER VICTIMS

The number of casualties is also down. 108 maritime migrants are reported missing or dead. That, again, is between nine and ten times less than last year (1'100). The victims, once more, are mostly sub-Saharan Africans departing from Libya. 55 died in mid-January off Misurata (FE 28.1.). On 19 June, seven 'North-Africans' were reported missing; whether they are Tunisians is uncertain. Also, Tunisian families demand information about 'harragas' missing since last year. As a sign of a more pluralistic polity, human rights organizations and the media are also getting involved (Magh 6.1., TL 30.3., Rep 21.4., Thawrah 5.6., TN 6.6.).The Tunisian authorities promise help, but the results are not encouraging.The main reason, so the Italian government, is the often poor quality of fingerprints needed for identification (ANSAmed 13.2., TL 5.3., Rep 21.4.).

FEWER SAR & DEBARKATION INCIDENTS

On 29 March, Tineke Strik published her report about the tragic SAR failure that occurred a year ago off Libya. The investigation, commissioned by the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, concludes that the main problem was a lack of coordination between Italy and NATO (CoE 29.3., PACE 24.4.). This year, fortunately, there was no comparable failure. In most cases SAR cooperation has functioned, also between Italy and Malta (ToM 31.5.). It even worked when merchant vessels were involved (ToM 15.1., ToM 28.5.). Also, Italian and Maltese politicians have emphasized the need for improved SAR cooperation (MT 21.3., ToM 23.6.). Only one SAR dispute was reported (CdS 17.3., MT 17.3.). The main problem, as usual, is the unresolved debarkation issue. On 14 July 2010, the European Parliament took the matter to the European Court of Justice (C-355/10). If the Advocate General's opinion of late April is an indication, the rules might have to be changed (ToM 23.4., MaS 25.4.). It would be a minor but important step in the shaping of a more realistic EU migration policy.

THE END OF PUSH-BACK ?

On 23 January, the European Court of Human Rights decided that push-back, as practiced by the Berlusconi and Gaddafi governments, amounts to 'collective expulsion' and violates the European Human Rights Convention (Hirsi v. Italy). The Monti administration announced that the practice has been discontinued and that it respects the court's decision (ANSA 23.2., ANSA 20.6.). But, as various NGOs report, some forms of 'collective expulsion' are still going on (AI 19.6., ANSAmed 20.6.). 53 Egyptians, for instance, were 'summarily' returned by air on 29 June, only two days after their arrival at Catania (ANSA 29.6.).

NEW BILATERAL MIGRATION AGREEMENTS

The transitional governments of Tunisia and Libya have entered into a number of bilateral migration agreements. We know very little about their content (AI 13.6.). On 3 April Libya signed a migration accord with Italy the main emphasis of which seems to be on border control and repatriation (ANSA 3.4.). Also in April, a joint Italian-Tunisian Military Committee discussed 'illegal migration as part of a comprehensive framework' (TAP 14.4.). The agreement that followed refers to a 'strategic partnership covering economic and security issues' (TAP 16.5.). Terms like 'framework' and 'strategic partnership' suggest accords that are relatively broad and, presumably, cover matters like border management, the training of border personnel, the financing of operations – and repatriations. But the modalities governing repatriation, as many other details, remain in the dark. There are, so far, no reports about formal Maltese migration agreements with either Libya or Tunisia.

MIGRATION PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS

Cecilia Malmström, at the inauguration of the EUI's new Migration Policy Centre (MPC) in Florence, called for the conclusion of migration partnership agreements (EUI 25.6.). She added that the Commission was in the process of negotiating such arrangements with Tunisia and Morocco (ANSAmed 15.5.). Partnerships, as the term implies, are two-way streets tackling migration in a comprehensive manner. Or, differently put, they deal with both irregular and regular migration and are therefore not limited to issues of security, control and repatriation. The regulation of economic migration is of particular importance. As the Commission's homepage shows the idea is to develop instruments encompassing professional training, academic studies and various types of short or long-term employment (EUCOM Immigration).

SWISS-TUNISIAN PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

It is in this spirit that Switzerland, in June, signed a migration partnership with Tunisia (TAP 11.6.). Confronted with the presence of 3'000 Tunisians unlikely to get asylum, the Swiss decided to approach the government in Tunis and to suggest the conclusion of a migration partnership. It is a typical give-and-take combining a number of arrangements. The Tunisians are ready to accept returnees and to facilitate the re-entry of undocumented 'harragas' by issuing the necessary papers. In return the Swiss provide various types of assistance to voluntary returnees, issue 18 month visas for 150 professional trainees a year, are ready to train Tunisian border guards and promise a generous handling of visa applications in general. The agreement, compared with those signed by Italy, is relatively transparent.

MORE FRONTEX REPATRIATIONS

FRONTEX manages an increasing number of multilateral repatriations (AI 13.6.). The Warsaw organization, on its web-page, speaks about 'joint return operations' (Operations) but fails to list actual return flights (Returns). 'Working arrangements' are the formal foundation for FRONTEX repatriations. Warsaw is in the process of negotiating such arrangements with various countries, amongst them Tunisia and Libya (Third Countries). FRONTEX, as said, reveals no details about past and ongoing returns, but Malta does. In May, Malta repatriated 64 Nigerians on three flights organized and financed by FRONTEX (ToM 1.5., ToM 10.5., ToM 24.5.). There was one flight to Ghana with 24 migrants (ToM 21.6.).

INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL BORDERS

When the EU JHA Council met in June, it dealt primarily with the reintroduction of temporary controls at Schengen's internal borders (Rep 7.6.). External borders and maritime migration were of marginal importance. The same priorities are reflected in the Commission's first Biannual Report on the Functioning of the Schengen Area (EUCOM 16.5.) covering the period from 1 November 2011 to 30 April 2012. The report's main focus is on organizational aspects and, once more, on the temporary reintroduction of internal controls. Remarks about Schengen's external borders are limited to three paragraphs. External borders may dominate the agenda when Cyprus assumes the presidency in July. The government announced that the completion of the Common European Asylum System was one of its top priorities (Cyprus Mail 26.6., ToM 8.6.).

MALTA RESETTLEMENTS

Malta's two resettlement schemes continue to function. With UNHCR support East African migrants who were granted asylum (Somalis, Eritreans and Sudanese) continue to be resettled in the United States. 27 of them departed in May and 19 in June, bringing this year's total to 213 (ToM 16.5., ToM 21.6.). The second arrangement is the EU Commission's EUREMA project. Four relocations were reported: Two to Norway (ToM 31.1., ToM 12.3.), and one each to Germany (ToM 13.2.) and to the Netherlands (ToM 6.6.). Unfortunately, there is no truly reliable information on EUREMA. The data contained in the Commission's report on Migration, Asylum and Free Movement are helpful but not really detailed (EUCOM, ToM 5.6.). 

'PROTOCOL ON THE MEDITERRANEAN'

PACE rapporteur Tineke Strik, in her Strasbourg address of 31 May, urged the EU to strengthen existing international rules of the sea. More precisely, EU members should draft what she calls a 'Protocol on the Mediterranean' covering such issues as rescue, repatriation and resettlement of migrants and refugees. Chris Said, the new Maltese Minister of Justice, also called for new legal steps. At the JHA Council meeting in June, he urged the EU to decide on a common resettlement policy and, tied to it, on a redefinition of the Dublin 'first country' rule (ToM 7.6.).

MIGRANT SMUGGLING

Many migrants travel on rubber dinghies driven by outboard motors, make use of satellite phones and navigating instruments, need gasoline, food and water supplies. Migrant smugglers (or 'facilitators') are in the business of providing these necessities and, as interviews show, charge at least € 1000 per person. At times they serve as 'captains', try to land at night and to evade capture. Accounts about arrests come primarily from Italy. More than a dozen cases were reported from January thru July. There are no similar reports from Malta although it is fair to assume that some migrants depart for Italy with the help of smugglers (ToM 29.4.). There is practically no information about court cases and sentencing. We read, however, that a Tunisian court started proceedings against a local migrant smuggler for organizing, in March a year ago, a trip from Sfax to Italy with 15 'harragas' missing (FFM 28.5.).

FEWER DATA GAPS

Compared to 2011, data gaps are narrowing. The number of victims recorded by Fortress Europe and by myself is virtually identical; we both count around 110 dead and missing (FE). Most arrival figures are close as well. On 7 June, the Malta government speaks of 832 landings; my figure is 827 (ToM 7.6.). Italian numbers, as reported by Anna Maria Cancellieri at the end of March, are also fairly congruent (CdS 28.3.). For Lampedusa her count is 573, mine 511. On all Italian coasts, so Ms Cancellieri, 1'407 migrants arrived. That leaves us with 834 arrivals once the Lampedusa figure is deducted; my count for Southern Italy is 765. It is possible, of course, that around 70 migrants landed on beaches not covered by this website. Data quality is obviously improving - with one noteable exception. For the 1st quarter of this year FRONTEX mentions over 1500 Central Mediterranean 'detections' (FRAN Q1 2012). My count is a mere 833! Also, questionable 2011 figures continue to make the round. Christofer Hein, director of the Italian Refugee Council (CIR), maintains that 2'200 migrants drowned in the 'Strait of Sicily' (ANSAmed 18.1.). The UNHCR figure is 1'500, my count is below that. Also, most of the major accidents occurred not 'in' but 'outside' the Strait of Sicily. FRONTEX, in its 2012 Annual Risk Analysis published on 20 April, contends that last year there were 64'000 'detections' in the Central Mediterranean, a claim that is imprecise, to say the least (ARA 20.4.).

MINIMAL FRONTEX INFORMATION

Some FRONTEX information is incomplete. On its website the organization mentions operations accomplished - but remains silent about those going on (FRONTEX). As shown, the pattern is the same for repatriations; the information we have about ongoing returns is indirect and from the press. It also applies to Joint Operations HERMES and AENEAS. The host country for both is Italy but they cover different parts of the Central Mediterranean. JO HERMES concentrates on the area south of Sicily; the focus of JO AENEAS is more to the East, on Apulia and Calabria - and on crossings from Greece, Turkey and Egypt. This year, if we are to believe Italian media reports, FRONTEX seems to specialize in aerial surveillance (ANSAmed, QI, WTM). Fortunately, other FRONTEX publications are somewhat more informative, at least on certain subjects. Examples are the regularly appearing Quarterly Reports (FRAN Q4 2011, FRAN Q1 2012) and the 2012 Annual Risk Analysis (ARA).

UNEVEN SAR INFORMATION

The most detailed SAR information comes from Malta. The local press, at times, publishes fairly exhaustive accounts of certain incidents. And, on their new website, the Armed Forces themselves inform about their operations (AFM). Not so in Italy. There is, to my knowledge, no regular SAR information emanating from official quarters. The news available stems mainly from the press. It is harder yet to obtain reliable SAR information from the other side of the Mediterranean. Only two incidents are reported from Tunisia. In January, the TCG stopped 43 migrants (TAP 12.1.) and in March, in the context of the Italian-Maltese disembarkation dispute, 74 migrants were taken ashore (MT 19.3.). The press release of 12 January mentions (in passing) that last year Tunisia 'thwarted' 24 illegal emigration attempts and 'rescued' 647 people. No further details are given. Tunisian reports seem to emanate from the government, but information about Libyan SAR incidents come mostly from the European press. These reports, too, are limited to two accidents. The first refers to the January tragedy with 55 victims (ToM 29.1.), the second to a May incident with 10 migrants missing (ANSA 26.5.). It is to be hoped that the two governments, as part of their reorganization, will adopt a more open information policy.

PART II - JULY-DECEMBER

SUMMARY STATEMENT

With only minor exceptions, the second part of 2012 is a continuation of the first. The same trends prevail. There are fewer crossings than in 2011, the number of accidents and victims has gone down, SAR and debarkation disputes have become less frequent. The geographical shift in arrivals – away from Lampedusa – continues. The pattern of departures, too, remains largely unchanged: Most migrants still leave from Libya. Diplomatic and political activities go on. Unilateral and bilateral efforts dominate but, as before, there is a lack of transparency and many aspects remain controversial. It is particularly true of Italy's relations with Libya and Tunisia.

The EU's primary focus is still on border control (FRONTEX) and on asylum policy (Common European Asylum System, CEAS). Actual controls, or various FRONTEX operations at the borders of the Schengen area, are still surrounded by an almost complete air of secrecy. We also know very little about efforts to shape EUROSUR and to define and to implement 'smart borders'. The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) has had a slow start and, so far, is of marginal importance. And, finally, the process of strengthening CEAS is cumbersome and slow. For Brussels the Schengen area was less important than the shaping of the Fiscal and the Banking Union.

FEWER ARRIVALS

Arrivals were down during the first six months of 2012, and the trend continued during the second six months. All told, 12'400 migrants landed this year, almost four times less than in 2011. As usual, the arrival pattern was uneven. Two thirds (or around 8'300) arrived during the second part of the year, compared to approximately 4'100 that came during the first six months. The increase is seasonal in character and largely determined by favorable weather conditions.

SHIFT IN DESTINATIONS

The shift in destinations continues as well. Southern Italy (defined as Sicily, Calabria and Apulia) is now the main area of arrival, with 5'822 landings for the entire year. Lampedusa is second with 4'622 disembarkations and a distribution that, again, is uneven. 849 migrants arrived on the island during the first part of the year, 3'773 during the second. The reason is the late inflow of 2'207 sub-Saharan Africans from Libya. They arrived from October to December, a dangerous season for travelling all the way from Libya to Lampedusa. Malta saw 1'891 arrivals, up from 1'566 in 2011. The increase was moderate and did not amount to what some Maltese feared would be a 'dramatic summer' (ToM 13.6.).

CONTINUITY IN DEPARTURES

Libya, as mentioned, is still the major country of departure. Of the 12'335 boat people that crossed the sea in 2012, more than half (or 6'403) left from Libya. 1'693 arrived during the first six months, 4'710 during the second six months. Practically all are sub-Saharan Africans, mostly from Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan and South Sudan. Libya is an important transit route (FRAN Q4 2012), which is not true of Tunisia. Of the 1'895 migrants arriving from this country almost all were Tunisian nationals. And, compared to 2011, the number of embarkations decreased sharply. With fewer than 2'000 arrivals Tunisia is now the least important of the three departure areas.

INCREASE IN DEPARTURES

Compared to 2011, there was a significant increase in arrivalsfrom the 'East'. 4'037 migrants landed this year, 1'335 during the first half, 2'702 during the second half. The total for 2011 was 2'804. The 'East' is now the second most important departure region, and most landings are in Apulia and Calabria. The reason for the increase is political instability in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. But some also leave from Pakistan and Bangladesh. An effort to determine national affiliation is undertaken by FRONTEX and published in its quarterly reports (FRAN Q1, FRAN Q2, FRAN Q3, FRAN Q4). There is also a marked increase of Egyptians. As FRONTEX shows, most of them arrive in Apulia and Calabria but, interestingly enough, some also make it to Sicily.

FEWER VICTIMS

The number of victims, like that of total arrivals, also decreased. For 2011, my count was 1'182 casualties; this year's number is 309. It is a four-fold reduction, paralleling the drop in arrivals. There were 108 victims during the first half of the year and 201 during the second half. Of the roughly 300 victims about 230 are said to be missing while 80 have died. These figures are imprecise and must be regarded with caution. Last year, some NGOs mentioned between 1'500 and 2'000 casualties, while my count – as stated – was 1'182. Figures about missing are usually based on survivor reports and less reliable than figures about dead that, in most instances, rest on an actual body count.

FOUR MAJOR ACCIDENTS

Two-thirds of this year's victims, or 226 of the 309, were the result of four major accidents. There was a first calamity on 28 January off the coast of Libya that claimed the lives of 54 Somalis (ToM 29.1.). Three more tragedies occurred during the second part of the year. One happened on 10 July off Tunisia with 54 Somali victims (Rep 10.7.). Another took place on 27 August at the Libyan-Egyptian maritime border with 40 casualties, probably East Africans (LH 30.8.). The largest accident occurred on 6 September 10 NM off Lampedusa involving 79 Tunisians (Rep 7.9.). We know relatively little about the three North African incidents, but there is some information about the Lampedusa disaster. According to survivors 130 migrants were packed onto an old 10 m vessel; an ambiguous distress message was received at Palermo in the early evening hours; the boat must have sunk rapidly because the 56 Tunisians rescued (by GC and NATO units) were adrift at sea; no traces of the distressed vessel could be found, which is rather uncommon. The Tunisian and Italian authorities started an investigation (TAP 13.9.). So far no results have been published.

PROBLEMATIC RESCUES

The September 6 tragedy shows that some rescues are problematic. Vessels are often overloaded and poorly equipped. Shortages of gasoline, water and food are common. Migrants suffer physically and psychologically. Tensions and quarrels are frequent. Rescues, in such circumstances, are no simple matter. Panics and stampedes turn transfers into dangerous ventures. To move people from vulnerable migrant vessels to large commercial ships is particularly demanding. On 15 August, for example, 157 sub-Saharan Africans on two small dinghies had to be rescued. 60 were taken aboard by a merchant vessel, 100 by the Maltese coast guard. Two migrants disappeared in transfer, two died on an AFM patrol boat and two after arrival (ToM 19.8.). Rescues can end tragically, even when handled professionally. But criminal behavior may also be involved. On 31 December, two Tunisians drowned off the coast of Sicily, 30 made it ashore (ANSA 31.12.). Some survivors told the Italian authorities that the 'facilitators', trying to escape, had simply thrown them overboard!

SUCCESSFUL RESCUES

It is a fact, however, that most rescue operations succeed. On 12 and 23 October, a total of 530 sub-Saharan migrants were rescued by Italian coast guard units and taken to Lampedusa (Rep 12.10., CdS 24.10.). On 9 November, 246 Africans were brought to Malta, a respectable performance given the limited AFM offshore capabilities (ToM 10.11.). On 24 November, the Italians took 235 Africans to Lampedusa; another 450 followed on 15 December (CdM 24.11., Rep 15.12.). On 28 December, ANSA reported that in 2012 Italy had rescued 6'000 migrants in distress at sea (CdS 28.12.). The claim is difficult to substantiate because, at times, it is hard to distinguish between rescues and interceptions. But, given the 10'000 arrivals at Italy's southern shores, the figure may not be too far off.

MORE SAR COOPERATION

Not a single SAR dispute flared up between Italy and Malta during the second part of 2012. The opposite is true. There were several instances of successful SAR cooperation (ToM 29.7., ToM 21.8., CdS 7.10.). Two operations took place in Libyan waters (AFM 24.10., AFM 6.11.), and in another the Libyan coast guard was involved as well (BBC 27.7.). Cooperation is important because some SAR situations are puzzling. In early July, 6 Somalis were rescued by the Maltese, but the remaining 60 refused and headed for Sicily (ToM 8.7.). Or, as happens regularly, some migrants pass through Maltese waters, ask the AFM for gasoline, and then insist on continuing to Italy. Are these instances of 'distress at sea' in conformity with international law? In September, Italy and Malta signed an agreement to improve SAR cooperation (ANSAmed 12.9.). Whether it will settle the thorny issue of disembarkation, we do not know.

LAMPEDUSA

Once Lampedusa was declared an 'unsafe port' in September of last year, arrivals were extremely low. The trend continued during the first part of 2012. It changed abruptly, however, with the arrival of over 2'000 sub-Saharan Africans during the last quarter. That, once again, strained the capacities of the reception center rebuilt for 300 persons. Over 800 had to be accommodated in November and early December (ANSA 29.11.). Thanks to two new actors, Giusi Nicolini, now mayor of Lampedusa, and Anna Maria Cancellieri, PM Monti's Minister of Justice, an emergency comparable to that of last year could be avoided.

ITALY

Unfortunately, other Italian problems remain unsolved. It remains uncertain when Lampedusa will once more become a port that is safe to land. And we still know next to nothing about the country's migration deals with Tunisia and Libya. In October, Italian officials visited Tunis to discuss the development of a 'comprehensive approach to illegal migration' (TAP 10.10.). No details were published. There is also no official information about the repatriation of Tunisian 'harragas' – neither from Rome nor from Tunis. Relations with Libya are inscrutable, too. In September, Italy and Libya agreed to re-negotiate the migration arrangement signed on 3 April 2011 (ToM 13.9.). As a follow-up FM Terzi visited Tripoli to discuss matters of migration and security (ANSAmed 6.11.). Nothing of substance was ever communicated. Many questions remain. What exactly is meant by 'security'? The push-back policy of earlier years seems to have ended, but what are the new arrangements? There are good reasons why Amnesty International, in a petition with 28'000 signatures, asked the Italian government to cancel the secret Libya agreement of April 2011 (Rep 19.10.). Concern about Italian-Libyan relations was also voiced by François Crépeau, the UN Rapporteur on Human Rights (MaS 27.11.).

MALTA

Practically all migrants arriving in Malta depart from Libya, reason enough for the two governments to be in touch. In contrast to Italy, however, there seems to be no formal agreement. But contacts exist. In July, a Libyan official visited Malta to discuss irregular migration and military assistance (ToM 5.7.). In December, PM Gonzi visited Tripoli to talk about energy and migration (ToM 7.12.). No details were published. But military cooperation got started. Toward the end of August, a contingent of 46 AFM personnel were in Libya to conduct a two-day exercise with local forces (AFM 28.9.). In October, two training courses attended by Libyan officers were held in Malta: A Basic Boarding Course and a SAR Coordination Course (AFM 15.10., AFM 27.10.). Malta is also beefing up its SAR capabilities – with EU funding. The AFM acquired two fixed-wing aircraft and four inshore patrol boats (ToM 26.9.). Finally, and important for Malta, the resettlement of East Africans (assisted by the US and by EUREMA) continues to function (ToM 10.12., ToM 12.12.). All told there were 420 resettlements in 2012 (ToM 18.12.). In July, EASO published a review of EUREMA activities.

CHANGING TUNISIA

Although involved in a difficult process of political transition, Tunisian society has become more open and pluralistic. Irregular migration and the fate of 'harragas' are topics increasingly discussed by NGOs, the media – and even by the government. During the second half of this year, there were three reports about SAR operations conducted by local forces (TN 6.7., TAP 15.7., TAP 26.11.). There were also reports about the prevention of four irregular departures (TAP 10.7., TN 7.8., TAP 11.9., TAP 18.9.). If we are to believe the Ministry of the Interior, in September the National Guard thwarted 14 illegal migration attempts involving 459 persons, including 160 foreigners (TAP 5.10.). Such information is rare and unsystematic, however. There is no news at all from the coast guard unit attached to the Department of Defense. Migrant smuggling also makes the news. In September, 18 Tunisians were arrested for trafficking 'harragas' (FFM 23.9.). And in July a Tunisian was sentenced to 15 years in prison for involvement in an April 2011 accident that caused the death of 19 nationals (LT 10.7.).

FATE OF 'HARRAGAS'

The 6 September tragedy received considerable attention, both by the Tunisian government and by the press. It all started, once again, with the families of missing 'harragas' protesting about a lack of information (TN 10.9., TN 11.9.). The government then began to act. PM Jebali announced the formation of an investigating committee and sent State Secretary Jaziri to Italy (TN 10.9.). Foreign Minister Abdessalem agreed to meet families of the missing 'harragas', and his ministry published the names of 56 migrants that were rescued (TN 11.9., TN 11.9.). A few days later, Tunisia and Italy agreed to form a joint commission of investigation (TAP 14.9.). On 26 September, the authorities arrested a migrant smuggler accused of organizing the September voyage (TN 26.9.). At the 5+5 Summit in Malta President Marzouki proposed the formation of a task force to review SAR cooperation and to propose improvements (MT 6.10.). So far there is no news about the results of these steps. A report dealing with the 'harragas' issue in some detail was published in March 2013 by FTDES, a Tunisian NGO.

LIBYAN BORDER CONTROL

Libya is also in the midst of political transition (ToM 10.8., TP 14.10.). The interim government faces a number of serious challenges. One is internal security and a need to gain territorial control. The grip on land and sea borders in particular has to be improved. A number of steps point in this direction. Around the middle of December, Libya announced the temporary closure of its borders with Niger, Chad, Sudan and Algeria (LH 18.12.). On 23 December, the government assumed control over the migrant detention center in the southern town of Sebha, a region of frequent unrest (LH 23.12.). A week later, the armed forces installed new check points along the Egyptian border (LH 30.12.). It is difficult to say, of course, how effective all these measures are. The European Union has also entered the scene. In July, the Foreign Affairs Council declared its readiness to assist Libya in the area of border management (EUC 23.7.). Toward the end of the year, there were reports about actual discussions and the signature of an EU-Libya MOU covering police and military matters (FFM 22.11., LH 30.11.). In December, PM Zeidan discussed border security while visiting Algeria, Niger, Chad and Sudan (LH 14.12.). Tunisia was also approached (LH 15.12.). As usual, detailed information about these measures is unavailable.

MIGRANT SMUGGLING

The lack of territorial control enables Libyan 'facilitators' to operate without much risk (FRAN Q4 2012). They do so inside the country and across its land and sea borders – often to the detriment of migrants. As shown earlier, interviews conducted by researchers show that they are regularly exploited, physically and financially. Newspaper stories tend to confirm this (ToM 18.11.). The plight of migrants is also documented in an investigation done by Amnesty International (AI 13.11.). And, as a UN inspector reports, the situation in Libya's south seems to be particularly bad (LH 25.11.). Improvements are necessary, but policing alone will not do. Migrants have to be treated in accordance with UNHCR rules which, of course, presupposes control over migrant smugglers and a measure of good governance. 'Facilitators' have a more difficult time in Italy. During the second part of 2012, according to media reports, the authorities arrested smugglers in at least a dozen cases. There was also a report of an Italian court sentencing two Greeks for involvement in the death of a migrant in July 2010 (ANSA 24.10.).

EU ASYLUM POLICY

The EU intended to strengthen the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) by the end of 2012. Several steps were taken, but no final agreement was reached. The legislative Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) discussed a range of asylum-related matters on two occasions (LIBE 11.7., EUPL 19.9.). Parliament itself debated CEAS, including the question of resettlement (EUPL 11.9.). The October JHA Council also dealt with asylum policy. On the agenda were issues like reception conditions, Dublin II and EURODAC (EUC 25./26.10.). As said, the effort failed. There was some progress, however, on other matters related to asylum. The European Court of Justice decided that Parliament must be involved in the formulation of the Schengen Border Code (EUCJ 5.9., MaS 10.9.). Also in September, FRONTEX appointed its first human rights officer (FRONTEX 27.9.). And, in November, LIBE approved legislation to upgrade the human rights standards applying to EUROSUR (EUPL 27.11.).

EU BORDER CONTROL

FRONTEX's primary function is to coordinate national measures of border control. But it can also launch its own initiatives. The instruments employed are a combination of traditional control operations and modern high-tech systems. In the Central Mediterranean, so far, conventional measures dominate. More precisely, FRONTEX organizes Joint Operations to control the inflow of migrants and, if necessary, to engage in search and rescue missions. Official information about these operations is minimal and imprecise. The FRONTEX website mentions JO Hermes (Central Mediterranean) and JO Aeneas (Ionian and Adriatic Sea) with only a few words and declares that both ended in March 2012. But in FRONTEX's own FRAN Q2 Report(April-June 2012) we read that from July to October of this year they were still in existence. And, according to FRAN Q4, JO Hermes will continue till the end of January 2013. The same uncertainty surrounds JO Poseidon. Meant to function between Greece and Turkey, the website lists this operation for the year 2009. But a UN report indicates that the mission was operative in 2012 and, furthermore, had expanded to cover the Greek-Italian border (OHCHR 3.12.).

FRONTEX REPATRIATION

FRONTEX also manages return operations. Such missions, from what we know, consist mainly of repatriation flights for migrants that fail to get asylum in a Schengen country. As shown earlier, FRONTEX does not mention the number of flights per operation. Its website merely indicates the country of destination and the 'host' (or departure) country. According to this list there were 24 'operations' in 2012, 25 the year before, and 37 in 2010. The information available, once again, is minimal. The same applies to the organization's FRAN Q2 Report and its reference to repatriations. It is useful to hear that throughout the quarter "Italy and Tunisia cooperated efficiently to repatriate Tunisian nationals". But it is exactly about this operation that we would like to know more.

SCHENGEN'S HIGH-TECH BORDERS

A major high-tech effort run by FRONTEX is the European External Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR). The project's primary purpose is to coordinate national border control systems. The program was initiated in 2008, and the geographic focus is mainly on the Mediterranean and North Africa. EUROSUR is accompanied by a series of high-tech initiatives, but it is difficult to gain an exact overview. One effort mentioned by the press is the development of drones (MT 29.7., MaS 8.8.). A particularly ambitious project is PERSEUS. Its goal is to integrate existing systems of maritime border control into one, to develop something like a system-of-systems. Finally, EUROSUR invests heavily in research and development, some of which is financed via the EU's 7^th Framework Program (FP7). Some of these projects are handled by defense contractors. Reason enough for some NGOs to speak of a growing 'securitization' or 'militarization' of Schengen borders.

SMART BORDERS

In the fall of 2011, the Commission suggested the development of 'smart borders' (EUCOM). The concept refers mainly (but not exclusively) to a set of measures useful for the identification of persons crossing the outer Schengen borders. Some instruments already exist. Border control officers make regular (and successful) use of the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS) and EURODAC, a program to register fingerprints (EUCOM). Two additional systems are in the making. To permit the tracing of 'overstayers', the largest group of irregular migrants, the Commission proposes an Entry/Exit System (EES). And, to facilitate the movement of frequent (and regular) visitors, the Commission envisages a Registered Travelers Programme (RTP) (EUCOM).

INFORMATION SOURCES

The flow of publicly available information from Tunisia and Libya has improved but is still irregular and imprecise. The main problem are the governments rather than the media. Officials are not (yet) in the habit of systematically reporting about irregular migration and blue border issues. The situation in Malta is different. Both the government and the media provide data that are useful and reliable. During the second half of 2012, the AFM re-did their website and now inform in some detail about SAR operations. The figures about 2012 arrivals mentioned by PM Gonzi in Parliament square completely with those I managed to obtain from the press and from the AFM (MT 6.11.).

In Italy the situation is less satisfactory. The media cover blue-border events as reliably as they can. La Repubblica contains detailed stories about the fate of migrants and about SAR operations. But government news is scarce. The ministries in Rome transmit figures to FRONTEX in Warsaw – but do not make them public. The two major coast guard agencies, GC and GdF, run extensive web-pages that, unfortunately, contain no information about actual operations.

To conclude: The over-all information situation about blue-border events is unsatisfactory. It is true for the Central Mediterranean but, as the EU Commission says in its Biannual Schengen Report, it applies to irregular migration as a whole – and most particularly to maritime migration (EUCOM 23.11.).

'CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN'

The Central Mediterranean, as defined on this website, includes (on the European side) Malta, Lampedusa, Sicily, Calabria and Apulia. FRONTEX (at least in its quarterly FRAN reports) operates with a narrower definition that excludes Calabria and Apulia. That, as I show below, has to be taken into account when comparing arrival figures. Both definitions are somewhat problematic because, when it comes to migration, it is impossible to neatly separate the Central from Eastern Mediterranean. Boatpeople arriving from the 'East' cross both seas and usually end up in Apulia and Calabria. But some Egyptians travel along the Libyan coast and end up in Sicily. FRONTEX, when counting Central Mediterranean arrivals, excludes the former but includes the latter. The wider definition, in this case, is more useful. It also has the advantage of including all of the Ionian Sea – which is definitely part of the Central Mediterranean.

COMPARING NUMBERS

FRONTEX, in its Annual Risk Analysis 2013, publishes the figures for 2012. The report, for the first time, mentions the numbers for both Sicily/Lampedusa/Malta and for Calabria/Apulia thereby facilitating a realistic comparison. All told FRONTEX lists 15'151 'detections', while my count is 12'335 'arrivals'. The FRONTEX figure, as usual, is higher. The difference is a hefty 2'816 individuals, almost 25%. For Sicily/Lampedusa/Malta the difference is 1'391, for Calabria/Apulia 1'425. The gap is difficult to explain. It is unlikely that the media, on which I rely, have missed thousands of persons. Could it be that 'detections' are something else than 'arrivals'? - The numbers mentioned in FRONTEX's fourth quarter report (FRAN Q4 2012) are higher as well, although the difference is only 10%. My count (for the Central Mediterranean in the narrower sense) is 3'000 'arrivals'; FRONTEX reports 3'476 'detections'.